CMJR 205: Questions for 1/12/09

1) Within the first chapter there was a discussion concerning the different categories of action and specifically in the included definition of symbolic action, the writer declared that “every attitude is also an incipient act, an act waiting to be done.” To this statement I have to raise contention because attitudes do not necessarily project what the future might turn out to be; in some ways attitudes merely act as responses, either intentional or not, to events in the present with no intention to change an outcome in the future. For example, if you happen to wake up late to class, you will automatically have a sour attitude. While this attitude might affect your disposition and actions for the rest of the day, it is not due to some unspoken objective, but was merely a response to waking up late. To call attitude an incipient act is to assume intent for the person with the attitude, which I believe is false. Is this reasonable?
2) The chapter concerning narratives and Homeric epics immediately caught my eye because of the writers’ claim that narratives occur in normative tradition and “act as bridges between cultural standards of conduct and belief and the material realities confronting members of that culture.” A key aspect in the Homeric epics was its supernatural theme involving Greek gods/goddesses who were heavily involved with the characters and their actions within the epic. Being a fan of fantasy (for that is my main draw to the Homeric epic), I would like to take this definition further and try to apply it to a fantasy narrative, not set within our world as we conceive it, involving characters that are completely inhuman and using themes that are not representative of cultural norms (such as cannibalism as a moral act). How then does this fantasy narrative adhere to the definition provided by Gerard Hauser if it itself is completely devoid of normative characteristics that could be applicable to current human lifestyles?
3) In the summary at the end of Chapter 2, Hauser says that language is inherently persuasive, and that it exists merely as a means for humans to draw themselves towards their own purposes. To assume that language is inherently persuasive is to posit that humans are inherently selfish; that our interactions with others is never for the benefit of them but for us to persuade other people to adopt our own opinions or turn them into pawns for our own gain. Perhaps, I might be taking his statement out of context, but at least connotation-wise, that is what I think of when he says it is inherently persuasive. Also, in doing so, he forgets the category of language that may fall under the term chitchat or small talk. During small talk neither of the parties are necessarily attempting to propagate their own particular views and to persuade the others to agree with them. Small talk is for the mere purpose of wasting an indeterminate amount of time, and often occurs between parties that do not know each other well. Is small talk/chitchat also considered inherently persuasive?